---
title: "Souveränität im Smart Home – (F)OSS alleine ist keine Lösung"
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
license_note: "The recording page https://media.ccc.de/v/clt26-257-souveranitat-im-smart-home-foss-alleine-ist-keine-losung states: Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. Confirmed 2026-10-18. The same sentence is in the event description returned by the public media.ccc.de API. No speech-subtitle track was listed. This note follows that description. It is an original summary, not a transcript."
source: https://media.ccc.de/v/clt26-257-souveranitat-im-smart-home-foss-alleine-ist-keine-losung
source_license: "CC BY 4.0"
attribution: "Summary by iinventedlight (AI-assisted). Source: Andy Börner, Karola Köpferl, Albrecht Kurze, Souveränität im Smart Home – (F)OSS alleine ist keine Lösung, Chemnitzer Linux-Tage 2026 (CC BY 4.0)."
date: 2026-10-18
status: published
category: talks
tags: personal data, smart home, privacy, sensors
checked_on: 2026-10-18
sources:
  - id: S1
    title: "Souveränität im Smart Home – (F)OSS alleine ist keine Lösung"
    authors: "Andy Börner, Karola Köpferl, Albrecht Kurze"
    url: https://media.ccc.de/v/clt26-257-souveranitat-im-smart-home-foss-alleine-ist-keine-losung
    accessed: 2026-10-18
    license: CC BY 4.0
    attribution: "Andy Börner, Karola Köpferl, Albrecht Kurze, Souveränität im Smart Home – (F)OSS alleine ist keine Lösung, Chemnitzer Linux-Tage 2026, CC BY 4.0, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0, https://media.ccc.de/v/clt26-257-souveranitat-im-smart-home-foss-alleine-ist-keine-losung"
---
# Souveränität im Smart Home – (F)OSS alleine ist keine Lösung

License: [CC BY 4.0](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0). Source: https://media.ccc.de/v/clt26-257-souveranitat-im-smart-home-foss-alleine-ist-keine-losung

## Summary
Andy Börner, Karola Köpferl, and Albrecht Kurze, speaking at the Chemnitzer Linux-Tage on 29 March 2026, argue that free and open-source software, by itself, does not make a smart home private. The description says people who refuse the large platform vendors often run a self-hosted setup, Home Assistant, and other free tools, and that this feels like independence. Local hosting and the absence of a cloud still do not guarantee privacy. Sensors that look harmless, such as motion, light, temperature, humidity, and air quality, are described as surprisingly revealing inside a private room. They support inferences about habits, whether someone is home, and social situations. The talk, as announced, follows three questions. How revealing are simple sensor readings? What follows for privacy, including conflict, control, or surveillance inside a household? And what can be done about that? The speakers say they will show examples from their own research in real households, explain the method, and present a format they call "Daten-Raten". The stated aim is to question assumptions about the smart home, control, and privacy. The description names the questions and the format. It does not report the findings. The recording page lists the three speakers without the "Dr." title. This note follows that description. The page lists no speech subtitles, so it does not report what was said on stage beyond that description.

## Why it is here
Askers want personal data kept somewhere safe. This talk's description says that motion, light, and air sensors in a self-hosted home still describe who is there, and that local hosting is not the same as leaving that data unused.
